The math is the product.
SCSA's guarantees are written down and peer-reviewable. Full papers and validation reports are available to qualified partners under briefing.
| Property | Conventional | SCSA |
|---|---|---|
| Key management | A single operator holds the key | t-of-n threshold MPC: no single party can decrypt |
| Time-locking | “Trust us” policy enforcement | Sequential time-locks: iterated hashing that cannot be parallelized |
| Tamper evidence | Editable access logs | Hash-chained audit log under Merkle commitment |
| Forward secrecy | Static keys persist | State ratchet: old keys securely zeroed |
| Post-quantum | RSA / ECC only | ML-KEM-768 hybrid key establishment (formally verified implementation) · ML-DSA-65 + SLH-DSA (FIPS 204/205) signing · hash-based STARK |
| Hardware binding | None: keys are portable | GPU attestation · TPM2 · TEE measurement-derived keys |
| Access privacy | Provider sees every access | Path ORAM: patterns indistinguishable from random |
| Build provenance | “Trust our build server” | Reproducible builds: byte-identical from source, published SBOM and measurements |
| Deletion | “We deleted it,” asserted | Provable erasure: key destruction with signed receipts — retained ciphertext is permanently unrecoverable |
Distributed key generation produces a canonical, signed transcript — participants, commitments, disqualifications, and the group key — that every party countersigns. Custody starts with a document anyone can verify, not a ritual anyone must trust.
Our authenticated key-establishment protocol ships with machine-checkable models of its security properties. The design is written to be verified, not just reviewed.
No trusted setup and no lattice assumption in the proof system: security rests on collision-resistant hashing, so the transparency proofs stand against quantum adversaries. Signatures are ML-DSA-65 and SLH-DSA hybrids and key establishment is an ML-KEM-768 hybrid, aligned to FIPS 203/204/205 — with a formally verified ML-KEM implementation.